Some facts about Sino-American relations

- America was having $58 billion direct investment in China in 2005.

- More than 100 multinational American companies are operating in China. Mainly in Hotel and petrochemical industry.

- According to some estimates, China will cross the economic power of America in 2025.

- US is a military power. Total defense budget of America is more than the combined defense budget of 100 big nations.

- Total trade between China and America was 33$ billion in 1992. In 2005, it rose to $284.5 billion.

- Total trade deficit of America with China was $200 billion in 2005.

- China is second largest importer of America.

Important Issues between China and America:

- Devaluation of Currency (Yuan) by China

- Republic of China (Taiwan)

- North Korea

- Human Right Violence in China

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The Debate on Feudalism

In the past few months there have been a lot of comments about feudalism in Pakistan. The general drift of the argument presented by many is that feudalism does not exist in the country any more.

There are others who argue that given the rise of capitalism in the country, feudalism is no longer a problem or a prevalent institution. So, have we now rid ourselves of the menace?

A couple of days ago, I had a chance to watch an old recording of a programme in which Makhdoom Amin Fahim of Hala talked to the famous Begum Nawazish Ali and claimed that feudalism in Pakistan was a thing of the past. He had a point, especially if we look at the concept from the perspective of the historical and textbook definition of the term. The term was first used in the 16th century referring to an institution which was distinguishable due to three elements: (a) the feudal lord, (b) the vassal and (c) fiefs.

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The feudal lord exercised power based on land which he would grant to the vassal who, in turn, would pay a certain amount to the lord or serve in his military force. Here was an issue of concentration of power, capital and labour. The lord of the manor had the power and the capital in the form of land and was also the master of the people who served under him. The vassal entered into a contract with the lord to serve in his military and pay dues in exchange for the latter’s patronage. The term itself was coined by 16th century British and French lawyers to describe certain traditions and norms which prevailed amongst the aristocracy.

From this perspective, the term cannot be used in Pakistan. Landholdings in most of the country are no longer what they used to be before the country came into being in 1947. The landholding in Punjab, for example, is much smaller than what one would find in some parts of Sindh or Balochistan. Again, most land owners do not maintain private armies. Neither do they have vassals who would fight wars for them.

In any case, according to Akbar Zaidi’s research, the larger landholdings have shrunk. For instance, in 1939, 2.4 per cent owners controlled 38 per cent of the agricultural land which changed later. Between 1950-55, 1.1 per cent owners controlled 15.8 per cent of land with farm sizes varying from 100 to 500 acres; 0.1 per cent of landlords owned 15.4 per cent land with a farm size of 500 acres and above. This seems to have changed within years, with farm sizes being reduced. This development is attributable to problematic land reforms and laws of inheritance which distributed land.

Another important development relates to the fact that most major landowners have become industrialists or successful entrepreneurs. They no longer have private armies. Instead, they run large industrial units such as sugar, ginning and textile mills. But does this data mean that feudalism is no more? The answer is no. In fact, the issue is that as the institution of feudalism was diluted it led to two separate but interdependent developments.

First, the landlords diversified in terms of their capital-generating capabilities and became industrialists and entrepreneurs. The logic was that since agriculture did not ensure greater profit margins, business and industry were selected as the new course. These big landlords also had the advantage of being in politics which was essential for negotiating loans and manipulating the state bureaucracy.

So, in this respect the feudal landlord diversified the source of capital formation. He either did it himself or in partnership with other elites. The land was not just an asset but it also became a source to provide the collateral against which loans were obtained from banks.

However, land continued to have its symbolic worth in the form of expression of power. Resultantly, other elite groups also started to mimic the landowning class and began acquiring land. The wonderful farmhouses around Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore are not just an expression of individual economic strength but a symbol of the political influence of an individual as part of the extended elite.

Hence, it is not surprising that other elite groups such as those comprising industrialists, generals, senior bureaucrats and educated professionals who acquired capital were inclined to buy farmland. During the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s, the elite of the civil and military bureaucracy were not interested in retaining or exercising control of the agricultural land which they got from the government. Most would either sell the land to local landowners or neglect it.

After the 1980s, especially after the value of land increased and the bureaucracy started to institutionalise its role in the state, the owners became interested in actively becoming farmers. Those who had the institutional support used it in one form or the other to establish better control. Thus, a new class of agriculturists was born. It had no links with the soil but willingly became an influential factor in far-flung areas.

Many generals and senior bureaucrats, for instance, became numberdars of their villages. While they were not performing the role of collecting taxes, which a numberdar is supposed to do, they enjoyed the authority which comes with the office.

Land ownership also had an impact on elite culture and ethos. The culture of farmhouses was not about having large houses but in many ways replicating the decadent lifestyle of the old nawabs and the feudal elite. For instance, the huge parties, mujrahs and the flaunting of money which takes place in these new settlements reflected the desire of the inhabitants for copying the traditional landowning elite. They were not rejecting a redundant culture but accepting it as a superior norm. The culture also portrayed a negative development.

Second, the new economic groups and non-landowning elite acquired the attitudes of landowning feudals in the form of the exercise of authority. In a traditional feudal culture, there is an essential relationship between the lord of the manor and the vassals.

In modern terms, the new elite started to behave like the lord of the manor with those in subordinate positions being treated as vassals or minions. There was, hence, the proliferation of a certain kind of attitude which permeated different vocational groups. As long as an elite group dominated an organisation or profession, the attitude could be replicated. New feudals were created from amongst the entrepreneurs, industrialists, the military and civil bureaucracy and professional groups. The late Hamza Alavi defined the professional group as part of the Muslim ashraf (elite) of pre-Partition India.

These new groups also represented the diversification of methods of capital formation which was no longer tied to agriculture. However, such diversification did not necessarily create a capitalist society but resulted in a hybrid form of feudalism which one could categorise as pre-capitalism in which the seeds of capitalism were sown in a solid base of feudalism.

The results have been damning. The feudal attitude and the culture of power have proliferated and entered all institutions. The key, of course, is the concentration of power and the subservience of groups of people under a central authority. Resultantly, the MQM is as feudal as the lord of the manor who operates from interior Sindh or other parts of the country.

Source: DAWN

Software Industry Overview in Pakistan

http://www.pseb.org.pk/item/industry_overview

The burka debate

NOW a draft bill is under consideration in the French parlia ment to impose a fine of 700 euros on any woman wearing a burka covering her whole body in any public place, and her husband twice as much if he forces her to wear the burka.

This is for the first time that women would be penalised for wearing the burka. Earlier France banned Muslim girls from wearing the hijab in schools. It argued that these religious symbols interfered with the state’s commitment to secularism and the French culture. In fact nothing happens without political ideology behind it. This measure is being championed by rightwing politicians who are exploiting anti-Islam feelings in France among a section of the people under the cover of secularism.

However socialists are opposed to any ban on the burka though they are not in favour of women wearing the burka. They feel women should be discouraged rather than banning the burka (which includes covering the face). Socialist spokesman Benoit Hamon announced that wearing the burka was not desirable but he did not favour a ban which would amount to an inconsistent ad hoc measure. “We are totally opposed to the burka. The burka is a prison for women and has no place in the French Republic,” he said. “But an ad hoc law would not have the anticipated effect.” The stand taken by the socialists appears to be quite logical. One cannot stop women from wearing the burka through a ban. It is quite undemocratic to punish one for wearing a certain type of dress. It is anti-democratic and anti-secular for a multicultural society. Let it be very clear that to cover the entire body, including the face, is not necessarily an Islamic way.

The Al-Azhar in Cairo has banned such a cover under an Islamic edict.

The ulema hold different views on the subject. A majority of them hold that covering the face and hands is not prescribed by the Quran or Sunnah. Only very few theologians and jurists want women to be fully covered. To compel women to so cover their bodies and face is indeed against women’s rights and dignity.

And a woman should be a free agent to decide for herself what to wear within decent limits and the cultural ethos.

However, this freedom also includes the right of women to cover their face, if they so desire and if they think it is a requirement of their religion. When I was lecturing at Bukhara University in a class of women students all of whom were wearing skirts with their heads uncovered, two women came fully covered including their faces. All other women demanded that these two burka-clad women be thrown out.

I told them to imagine that the burka-clad women were in a majority and two women had come wearing skirts with their heads uncovered, and the majority of the burka-clad women had demanded that those two women be thrown out — how would they feel? I, therefore, argued against getting violent just because someone dresses unlike us. We should have a dialogue with them and persuade them, if we can.

There could be a number of reasons why one prefers to wear a certain kind of dress. Maybe there is coercion by parents or husband which is undesirable. Or maybe one thinks it is a religious requirement or one tries to assert one’s right. Or maybe one is trying to fight cultural alienation. Certain dresses also become identity markers. Many Muslims who migrate from Asia and Africa experience a cultural shock when they see French or other European women wearing scanty dresses like bikinis. Thus they feel all the more compelled to wear their traditional dress.

Also, in France and several other European countries migrants are marginalised and feel alienated which pushes them into practising their own cultural norms. And then it is also to be remembered that all Muslim women in France do not wear such dress covering themselves fully. In fact many Muslim women have integrated themselves in French society by taking to western dressing.

A ban will only build up resistance among traditional Muslim women and they would try to defy the law resulting in social tension. It would be far better to resort to persuasive ways to discourage the more traditional women from wearing the all-covering burka.

Persuasion alone will not work unless backed by other measures, economic as well as social, to fight the alienation of religious and cultural minorities.

Thus, one needs multi-pronged measures to contain this problem. The Muslim ulema and intellectuals living in France also have to adopt creative ways to interpret Islamic traditional sources to address emerging conditions. It is necessary to revisit traditional sources which were rooted in a medieval, tribal/feudal culture.

Source: DAWN

Cellphone revolution

IN the early hours of New Year’s Day 1985, Michael Harrison phoned his father, Sir Ernest, to wish him a happy new year. There may appear nothing remarkable in such a filial affection, but Sir Ernest was chairman of Racal Electronics and his son was making the first-ever mobile (cell) phone call in Britain, using the network built by its newest investment. Later that morning, comedian Ernie Wise made a very public mobile phone call from St Katharine Docks, east London, to announce the very same network was now open for business. At the time, mobile phones were barely portable, weighing in at almost a kilogram, costing several thousand pounds and, in some cases, with little more than 20 minutes talktime. The networks themselves were small; Vodafone had a dozen masts covering London and west along the M4 motorway corridor while Cellnet launched with a single mast, stuck on the BT Tower. Neither company had any inkling of the huge potential of wireless communications and the dramatic impact mobile phones would have on society over the next quarter century. Sponsor's Ad: The first generation of handsets quickly became synon ymous with the yuppie excesses of Margaret Thatcher’s Britain in the mid-1980s. But hardly anyone believed mobile phones would be so popular that there would be more phones in the UK than there are people. For the first decade the predictions that mobile communications would not be mass market seemed correct. “In 1995, 10 years into the history of mobile phones, penetration in the UK was just seven per cent,” according to Professor Nigel Linge, of the Computer Networking and Telecommunications Research Centre, at the University of Salford, England. “In 1998, it was about 25 per cent, but by 1999, it was 46 per cent, that was the tipping point. In 1999, one mobile phone was sold in the UK every four seconds.” By 2004, mobile phones in Britain reached a penetration level of more than 100 per cent. The boom was a consequence of increased competition which pushed prices lower. The industry has spent the later part of the past decade trying to persuade people to do more with their phones than just call and text, culminating in the fight between the iPhone and a succession of touchscreen rivals — soon to include Google’s Nexus One. ¦ — The Guardian, London

Radicalisation abroad

FOR decades Pakistan has re lied on remittances from its workers abroad to finance eco nomic and social development at home. In 2009, one of the most difficult years for the Pakistani economy, the only thing that showed some improvement was the level of remittances.
While exports declined by six per cent and imports by 10 per cent, remittances increased by 22 per cent. Without an in crease of this magnitude Pakistan’s ex ternal situation would have been even more difficult today. The fact that the State Bank of Pakistan was able to re build its external balances to a comfort able level owed a great deal to this steady increase in the then level of re mittances. Any disturbance in this trend will have grim economic consequences.
For years the US had become the largest source of remittances from abroad, as the people who traced their origin to Pakistan became more involved with the development of what was once their homeland. However, much to the concern of many, the Pakistan-US link seems to be providing another type of flow: there are some among the Muslim community in the United States who seem to have decided that they should join what they view as the Muslim world’s fight against the Christian West. Some of these misguided people are heading towards Pakistan.
The arrest in Pakistan some time ago of five young men from the suburbs of Washington on suspicions that they were planning to fight against the Pakistani state and the US has raised a number of disturbing issues. They need to be addressed seriously by the people of Pakistan, by the Pakistanis in the United States, by Washington and by Islamabad. If what we are witnessing is a trend it will have worrying economic, political and social consequences for Pakistan. It will, most certainly, isolate the country even more from the world at a time when it needs external support for dealing with an unprecedented economic crisis.
A comforting conclusion was reached by many analysts and possibly also by Washington that there were good reasons why the United States was spared another terrorist attack following 9/11. It appeared that the focus on homeland security kept potential troublemakers out of the country. And there was the belief that the Muslims in the United States were not vulnerable to radicalisation.
Was the latter conclusion incorrect? Are the American Muslims susceptible to the kind of influences and pressures that have driven so many of their co-religionists in Europe to take desperate action against the countries in which they reside? According to one analyst, “the notion that the United States has some immunity against terrorists is coming under new scrutiny”.
The conclusion that the American Muslim community has not been radicalised seems not to be entirely correct although by and large it is better integrated in the US economy and society than is the case with the one in Europe. This is in part because a large number of Muslims in the United States have different socio-economic backgrounds than those who went to Europe.
Are the Pakistanis in America more inclined towards radicalisation than Muslims from other communities? There have been disturbing incidents of terrorism in America lately, as well as apparent intentions of committing them. Many have either involved young men from Pakistan or visits to Pakistan for training to commit violence. The fact that Pakistan has become the hub of global terrorism inspired by various Islamic causes should be of considerable concern to Islamabad.
What are the various choices available to the makers of public policy to stop this situation from deteriorating? First, Washington needs to ensure that in its zeal to protect itself, it should not further limit access to the country to Pakistani youth. It is becoming increasingly difficult for Pakistanis to get visas to attend colleges and universities in the US.
This is unfortunate since Pakistan’s educational system is extremely weak and one way of compensating is to send the youth to institutions in America. Restricting this will alienate the Pakistani youth even more. Washington should also encourage non-radical imams teaching and giving sermons at the various mosques in the country to stop the young from drifting towards extremism.
While the US has a role to play, much of the action needs to be taken by Islamabad and the country’s provincial governments. There are two obvious areas of policy intervention. The first, of course, is improving the educational system. This needs to be done at all levels.
Not only has Pakistan neglected primary education, it has also paid relatively little attention to higher education. Without improving the skill base of the vast army of the young in the country — Pakistan with a me dian age of 18.2 years has one of the youngest populations in the world — the youth will continue to be attracted to radical causes.
Of equal importance is the action by the state against organisations in the private sector that have openly recruited the young for pursuing extremist causes. There is no point in denying that this was being done by the state to compensate for India’s growing military strength. The jihadi groups were being prepared to do battle in case the two countries went to war again.
This strategy has massively backfired. These groups have turned on the Pakistani state and the Pakistani people. The state policy has taken a 180-degree turn. These groups have to be eliminated by the use of all means, including force, available to the state. Keeping them in reserve as insurance against India will not work. This is now the time for Pakistan — the government and the people — to move against extremism. Not pursuing this objective with the full might of the state and citizenry will do the country even more harm.

By Shahid Javed Burki

Source DAWN

Permissibility of music

THE other day I read an article in the Friday edition of an Urdu newspaper which quoted a few traditions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) to argue that music is strictly prohibited in Islam, and that Allah will send those who burn musical instruments to paradise. Many non-Muslims also ask this question frequently as to why Islam is opposed to music. Mughal emperor Aurangzeb is also said to have strictly prohibited music. But is music really prohibited in Islam? My study into the matter shows it is not prohibited per se. The Quran denounces what it calls lahw wa la’b (i.e. fun and play), and there was a background to it. Arabs in pre-Islamic times had no serious religious faith and used to indulge in drinking, singing and dancing as we often witness in our societies also. Islam wanted to engage people in serious activities of containing social evils and make them obedient to Allah thereby becoming good, just and compassionate human beings, undertaking fight against all prevailing social evils. For such way of life naturally lahw wa la’b was a serious obstacle; hence the Quran warned people against it.However, many Muslims could not distinguish between the two and declared music prohibited, whatever its form or context. While traditional ulema denounced music, Sufi saints generally approved of it, and distinguishing between lahw wa la’b and harmless fun, they allowed music as a tool to God-realisation. Music could induce a sort of ecstasy which in turn helped in being closer to God. Thus sama’ which literally means listening to music was practised by Sufis.It was for sama’ that qawwali was invented, as far as my knowledge goes, by Khusro, the celebrated disciple of Nizamuddin Awliya who used to have sama’ (i.e. congregation for devotional music). Those traditional ulema who were jealous of Nizamuddin Awliya’s popularity issued a fatwa against him for attending sama’ and the sultan asked him to come to his court to defend himself. He went to the sultan’s court (otherwise he never paid a visit to any sultan) and defended himself by reciting certain ahadith and came away. Maulana Rumi had gone a step further and even resorted to dancing to induce such divine ecstasy. His followers regularly resort to dancing, and are known as the whirling dervishes.It was because of such controversies created by a section of the traditional ulema that an eminent scholar like Ghazali wrote an epistle on Status of Music in Islam — Discipline and Rules of Music and Ecstasy. It is worth reading for all those who want to understand whether Islam prohibits music or not; or if prohibits, what kind of music it prohibits.Al-Ghazali begins his Risala on music with these words, “Know this my dear about the fact and situation of man that there is a secret of God which is hidden in the human heart; which is similar to the one that is between iron and stone. Just as fire emits when iron strikes stone and sets forest on fire, a movement occurs in the human heart when it hears good and rhythmical sounds. And unconsciously a new situation comes into existence in the heart.”He further says, “The upper world of beauty and grace and the fundamental of beauty and grace is due proportion. And, whatever is proportionate is the manifestation of the beauty of that upper world. The beauty and proportion that we see in this world is the product of the beauty and grace of the upper world. Therefore, good, rhythmical and proportionate sound has a similarity with some of the wonders of the upper world. And it provides new informations in the heart in the form of a movement and eagerness.”Further, Ghazali says, “Whoever’s heart is filled with the fire of the eagerness of God, music becomes necessary for him, so that the fire may be brighter. The same music becomes haram (prohibited) and poisonous for a man whose heart is full of the love of wrongful matters.”What is this wrongful matter that Ghazali refers to? It is lust, frolic and music meant for worldly pleasure like the ones youngsters indulge in after drinking in clubs and such other institutions. Of course Indian classical music does not fall in this category; it is great art and a discipline in itself. Even qawwali and ghazal singing are based on Indian classical music. For that matter, western classical symphonies are also well cultivated art representing the best in human beauty and grace.Of course, Ghazali does not base his epistle only on such arguments but also on ahadith which tell us how the Prophet himself listened to music on occasion along with Hazrat Ayesha, his beloved wife. This can be discussed further in another article.

By Asghar Ali Engineer

The writer is an Islamic scholar who heads the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, Mumbai.

Source: DAWN

Source of Terrorism

ALTHOUGH there are still a couple of weeks to go before the new year, 2009 will go down in Pakistan’s exceptionally turbulent history as the country’s bloodiest year — bloodier than the time of ‘Operation Cleanup’ in the early 1990s in Karachi.
The security forces then dealt with a situation that was confined to one city, albeit the largest in the country and that was the result of warring groups seeking to establish their political and economic writ. It was not aimed at destroying the Pakistani state or establishing a new political, economic and social order. It was about control of the city. This time the state is the target. Pakistan is dealing with an insurgency that poses an exis tential threat.
Complicating the situation is the fact that the germs of this insurgency were planted by operators both within and outside Pakistan. According to popular belief the main reason for the development of extremism in the country was the involvement of the US in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the decision by Washington to pull out of the area that, in policy terms, it now refers to as AfPak.
The US left once the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. But that is only a quarter of the explanation. There were several others. Among these was the social and political engineering of Gen Ziaul Haq who decided on his own and without the aid of public support that Pakistan needed to adopt Islam as the basis of its economic, political and social systems.
Under him, the country went through a wrenching change which was aided and abetted by the several Arab states with which his government had become closely associated. Saudi Arabia was particularly important in pushing Pakistan in that direction. It had helped finance Mujahideen efforts in Afghanistan and also financed the founding and development of a number of madressahs in large cities.
These madressahs taught a version of Islam that was mostly foreign to Pakistan. This is how Wahabi Islam struck roots in Pakistani soil. It flourished in particular in those areas whose people had been exposed to it because of their sojourn in Saudi Arabia.
One relatively less understood reason for the rapid growth of this more orthodox interpretation of Islam is the channel it found through the temporary migration to the Gulf states from Pakistan’s northern areas. This lasted for a decade and a half, from the mid1970s to the early 1990s, and involved several million people from northern Punjab and the NWFP. These workers were hired on fixed contracts, stayed in camps near the construction sites, and spent a good deal of their spare time in the mosques. They thus came under the influence of the local imams steeped in the Wahabi tradition. They brought this interpretation with them when they returned to Pakistan.
Also contributing to the problem is the fact that Pakistan’s political development was arrested because of the repeated involvement of the military in politics. The state’s priorities kept on changing as the leadership provided by the military in politics changed. But there was one thing common in the way all four military dictators governed. They had little confidence in the political will of the people they governed; all knowing, they ruled the country according to their particular whims.
Ayub Khan believed in limited democracy. He called it basic democracy. Ziaul Haq believed in what he thought was the Islamic way — the people should be governed by a pious leader who should not be constrained by the expressed wishes of the people. His only obligation was to consult a group of wise people chosen by the pious leader and assembled in a forum he called the shura.
Pervez Musharraf went back to the Ayubian formula by limiting democracy to a system of local government and a king’s party controlling a largely inconsequential national legislature. Being military men, these leaders believed in strong command and control systems in politics and economics .Since they were distant from the people they could not build popular support for their policies.
By far the most important contributor to the rise of extremism was the way a series of administrations managed the Pakistani economy. For many decades Pakistan experienced one of the sharpest increases in the rate of population growth. The country’s population at the time of independence was only 32 million of which 10 per cent lived in urban areas. It has increased almost five and a half times to 170 million on the eve of 2010.
This implies an average rate of growth of over three per cent sustained over a period of 60 years. Although the country has not held a population census for many years, I believe that nearly a half of this large and growing population is now urban. The urban population has increased at the rate of 4.5 per cent a year, again one of the highest in the world.
Unfortunately these demographic developments were not factored into the making of economic policy. Islamabad should have focused not only in getting the economy to grow rapidly — which it did on occasions and during the periods when the military was in charge – but also on ensuring that the rewards of rapid growth were widely distributed. The result is that the country now has millions of alienated youth with little faith in their future. They have been successfully recruited to jihadist causes. The latest of these is the destruction of the Pakistani state.
In developing an approach towards growing extremism and terrorism it is breeding, policymakers as well as the citizenry must first understand its complex causes. By focusing on just one aspect — the American pressure to go after the perpetrators of terrorist activities — the country will not be able to evolve a cogent response.

by Shahid Javed Barki

Source: Dawn

Consensus reached on NFC Award

LAHORE: The 7th National Finance Commission Award has been announced. The provinces are all set to get 12.5 per cent more from the federal divisible pool in the next five years. They will get 56 per cent in 2010 and 57.5 percent for the following four years.
All provinces had already agreed on a vertical distribution. But for the first time they have agreed on a horizontal distribution based on a multiple-criteria formula.
The criteria include population which consitutes 82 per cent of the share, poverty which will get 12 per cent and area and revenue generation that are to get three per cent each.
Announcing the award, Finance Minister, Shaukat Tarin said that in accordance with population density, Punjab will get 51 per cent of the share, Sindh will get 24 per cent, NWFP, 14 per cent and Balochistan 9 per cent.
NWFP will get one per cent from all provinces for fighting the war on terror.
Balochistan will get 83 billion rupees which is 10 billion more than the 6th NFC award.
Hailing the decision as the second achievement of democracy following the restoration of the judiciary, Punjab Chief Minsiter Shahbaz Sharif thanked all provinces for reaching a consensus on the issue.
Balochistan CM, Aslam Raisani, Sindh CM Qaim Ali Shah, Balochistan CM, Ameer Haider Hoti also hailed the mutual agreement on formulae for division under the NFC as a great acheivement. -DawnNews

Plan for 1,500MW rental power plants

The Economic Coordination Committee approved on Friday plans to set up rental power projects to generate 1,500MW and sent a summary to the cabinet for approval.
Water and Power Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf told journalists after the meeting that in view of a requirement of 2,700MW generation through rental power plants (RPPs), the ECC had asked his ministry to arrange 2,200MW from 14 companies in order to get rid of loadshedding.
‘The ECC meeting today approved 1,500MW to be generated through the RPPs and directed the power ministry to seek 200 mmcfd of gas from the petroleum ministry to generate 700MW from the existing system,’ Mr Ashraf said.
He said that if the petroleum ministry failed to provide the required gas more electricity would be generated through the RPPs.
He said the average tariff for IPPs was 12.5 cents per kilowatt hour while that for RPPs was 13.5 cents per unit. He rejected opposition’s allegations and said no one had provided any concrete evidence of misappropriations against his ministry over the RPP issue.
The plan had been approved by parliament after four days of debate on the RPP issue, he added. ‘Maximum tariff for any RPP is 15 cents per unit and that too for the barge-based generation plant for Karachi.’
In reply to a question about the financial impact of the RPP, Mr Ashraf said that when the plants came online the overall tariff would rise by six per cent.
However, he said, it would be the decision of the government to pass on the increase to consumers or to provide subsidy.
Mr Ashraf said the RPP policy had been adopted over the world and countries like Saudi Arabia and India were also getting electricity through RPPs. ‘We have to decide weather to get electricity or face loadshedding which is resulting in unemployment, low economic growth and protest demonstrations.’
The minister said that the energy mix consisted of hydel, thermal (both public and private sectors), nuclear and limited quantity of coal and wind.
He said the hydel power generation depended on water which was mainly controlled by the Indus River System Authority for irrigation and a new hydel project required at least eight to 10 years.
‘A thermal power plant requires five years and a coal-based plant six years. The country has no other option but to go for rental power plants.’
Mr Ashraf said that 14 per cent mobilisation advance payments were being made to the RPPs and the amount would be deducted from tariff payments when plants became operational.
He defended the advance payment and said it was being done to expedite the commissioning of the plants.
He said the government was also working on hydel power plants and projects like Bhasha Dam and Neelum-Jehlum power plants and it would soon start work on the Bunji dam project.

Source: The Dawn